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Some scholars argue that the Afghan police are regularly engaged in bribery and drug-
related corruption. Prevalent corruption in the Afghan police has demonstrably resulted in 
greater support for the Taliban which is a threat to security. This suggests that a robust anti-
corruption strategy is needed to restore legitimacy in the Afghan state and police and to 
counter the insurgency. This article initially provides a discussion of police corruption in 
Afghanistan that reveals four interrelated explanations: (1) structural causes of corruption, 
patronage and nepotism, (2) low pay, (3) state capture, and (4) ethnic favouritism. The 
research methodology included 70 semi-structured interviews with elites conducted by the 
author in Kabul during May–June 2010 and 100 surveys conducted with patrolmen and 
lieutenants in various Afghan provinces during January–March 2012. The article finds that it 
can prove counterproductive to post poorly paid policemen in distant provinces in order to 
challenge patronage relations as it tends to exacerbate survival-based corruption. Moreover, 
improved pay reform could help reduce survival-based corruption in the Afghan police but 
systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain if it is not implemented 
alongside other wider structural initiatives.  
 
Introduction  
In Afghanistan, administrative corruption, state capture, systemic and political corruption, 
patronage, cronyism, bidding for Chief of Police (CoP) appointments and drug-related 
corruption has hindered effective law enforcement. This is due to the fact that institutions and 
anti-corruption units have been infiltrated by the government to serve criminal interests. 
Those criminal interests are often linked to the drug trade. As a number of experts have 
 
 
observed, many elements of Afghan government structures serve individual patrons and not 
the wider public interest.1 For instance, appointments of senior officials, such as police chiefs 
and provincial governors, are based on bidding wars: positions regularly sell for hundreds of 
thousands of United States (US) dollars and these positions cost even more in high drug 
producing areas.2 This has distorted both the provision of security and the rule of law.  
The rule of law is perverted by the Afghan police to serve all manner of criminal 
activities, such as: drug trafficking (and preserving the interests of criminal groups involved 
in trafficking), land theft, real estate swindling, tax and customs evasion, the operation of 
illegal security forces and illegal monopolies on markets with legal goods, and so forth. The 
Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan government are perceived as highly corrupt in the 
eyes of ordinary Afghans. This has led to public discontent toward an illegitimate 
government and police force that has arguably remobilised support for the Taliban. As a 
consequence, the security situation has further deteriorated. Therefore, a robust anti-
corruption strategy for the Afghan police force is required due to the fact that—as is held to 
be central to the proper functioning of a liberal state—the police and judges are pivotal law 
enforcement actors.  
This article examines the features of corruption and clientelism in the Afghan police and 
assesses the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies implemented to date. In the first 
section, the research methodology is outlined and this is followed by an overview of the 
different forms corruption takes and the perceptions of corruption among ordinary Afghans. 
This allows for a consideration of four prominent causes of corruption in the Afghan police. 
Subsequently, the following two sections discuss internal Ministry of Interior (MoI) anti-
corruption strategies, pay reform, recruitment and stationing in the ANP. This provides the 
basis for an analysis of the findings from the original research conducted by the author, 
 
 
consisting of interviews and surveys. It provides insights with respect to the respondents’ 
perceptions on pay and living costs, corruption, clientelism and anti-corruption strategies.  
The article finds that pay reform alone will fail to combat systemic corruption, 
clientelism and state capture. Moreover, care needs to be taken when randomly assigning 
low- paid policemen, particularly sole breadwinners, in distant provinces to undermine the 
phenomenon of policemen remaining loyal to local power-brokers. This serves the purpose of 
reducing patronage corruption on the one hand, however, economic-incentive-based forms of 
corruption may intensify on the other. Those officers posted away to other provinces find 
circumstances very tough—prompting reliance on illicit activities—which undermines the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, namely pay reform and random assignment. This 
will be explored in the analysis.  
 
Research methodology  
Existing primary case studies have involved research conducted with the ANP but usually at 
the higher levels.3 Hence, there is a gap in the literature with only limited research conducted 
thus far with lower ranks of the Afghan police, which make up the majority of the ANP. In 
order to contribute to this area with original empirical data, initially 70 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with elites in Kabul during May–June 2010 concerning corruption 
and clientelism in the Afghan security and judicial sectors. This was followed by surveys 
conducted in January–March 2012 with lower levels of the uniform police, covering the main 
issues of corruption and clientelism.  
Due to deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan the researcher decided to conduct 
surveys with the assistance of a known local Afghan company. One hundred surveys were 
conducted by the researcher and Quest Companies, initially in Kabul. However, the research 
team had to relocate to 14 other nearby provinces due to the security crisis in the capital 
 
 
during late February–March 2012.4 Consequently, the research team completed the surveys in 
the local researchers’ home provinces, which were mainly Logar and Laghman, in which 
there were better logistics. This means that the findings are not generalisable for the entirety 
of Afghanistan due to the surveys being small scale. It must therefore be stressed that the 
figures presented in the findings are not statistically significant. Yet, the purpose of these 
surveys is to bring out low-ranked policemen’s perceptions on living standards, corruption 
and anti-corruption qualitatively.     
Of the 100 surveys, 76 were conducted with patrolmen, followed by 16 with first 
lieutenants and eight with second lieutenants. Sixteen surveys were conducted in Kabul, 26 in 
Logar, 14 in Laghman, six in Nangarhar, six in Kunduz, six in Kapisa, four in Paktia, four in 
Panjshir, four in Takhar, four in Khost, two in Jowzjan, two in Kunar, two in Bamiyan, two 
in Maidan Wardak and two in Parwan. The key variables (determinants of corruption) 
surveyed were: family size, owned/rented house, sole/multiple breadwinners, living costs, 
expenses and home/away province. These have an impact on economic necessity and 
‘survival-based corruption’.  
 
Corruption in the Afghan National Police  
Prior to any analysis of anti-corruption strategies, it is important to provide a broad overview 
of corruption relating to the ANP. It must be stressed that the Afghan police forces consist of 
several branches and structures, such as the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border 
Police (ABP), the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and Afghan National 
Civil Order.5 This paper primarily focuses on corruption within the lower levels of the 
uniformed police. The forms and perceptions of corruption are considered below.  
   
 
 
 
Forms of corruption  
Police corruption concerns the misconduct of police officers and patrolmen. Prominent 
examples of this are: accepting bribes and extorting illegal tolls; manipulating laws, duties 
and rules; breaching human rights; and interfering with investigations, arrests and the justice 
system to obtain financial or personal gain. Bribery and extortion are two main forms of 
police corruption that provide officers with opportunities to make additional money to 
supplement poor wages. Police officers may demand extortive payments from citizens, such 
as false traffic fines in Pakistan, or else threaten to arrest citizens if a falsified fee is not paid.6  
Similarly in Afghanistan, the ANP has developed a reputation of engaging in bribery and 
toll extortion. In many cases at the provincial level, the traffic police request payments to 
allow vehicles to pass. If these are not paid, drivers face being charged for bogus violations—
the proceeds from which are then paid up the chain of command to the CoP. In Kandahar, 
senior police have been charging 20,000 Afghanistan Afghani (AFN) (an estimated US$400 
at the time) for every passing vehicle, and failure to pay leads to seizure of the vehicle.7 
Moreover, police commanders collect wages of ‘ghost’ policemen by overstating the numbers 
working under them.8 Often, the Ministry of Finance representative who ‘was supposed to 
supervise the CoP’ would have involvement in such corruption.9  
There are certain factors motivating police corruption such as the possible illicit rewards 
to be won by engaging in poppy trafficking. This usually occurs at the provincial level with 
local power brokers and the local government.10 The police also manipulate poppy 
eradication schemes by extorting bribes from farmers. The Afghan security forces are corrupt 
in many more ways than simply taxing cultivators of the poppy crop or smuggling opium. 
Other corrupt practices include roadside extortion, equipment and uniform abuse and paying 
off bosses to retain posts in profitable areas for extortive practices.11 In addition, there is a 
sense that prosecution and justice are commodities for sale.12 For instance, the United States 
 
 
Institute of Peace (USIP) Rule of Law Advisor argued that drug smugglers are able to bribe 
or intimidate police and judges to drop their charges.13 All the ANP, particularly the ABP and 
the CNPA, are overwhelmed with drug-related corruption.14 Criminals or drug-lords may 
often bribe senior police officers or border police in exchange for cash incentives in the 
Afghan narcotics industry and local power brokers are engaged in the drug-related protection 
industry.  
The police are also prey to corrupt senior actors that can breed corruption in the lower 
ranks, who have low literacy rates of 14–15 per cent.15 The Head of Transitional Justice for 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) similarly argued that 
‘corruption is widespread all over institutions’ and ‘this is more evident in the security 
forces’.16 However, it should be acknowledged that there are differences between the police 
and army. 
Despite the huge resources invested by international donors, patronage has flourished. 
Individuals and groups compete for favours from patrons who distribute state resources and 
jobs and this can disrupt police reform and clear policy-making.17 Therefore, it is also 
important to note that a principal driver of corruption among the Afghan police is ethnic 
favouritism. This has an important influence on both internal structures and promotions 
within the police as well as police relations with local communities and hence their perceived 
legitimacy. There are clear ethnic patterns when studying CoP appointments from different 
Ministers of Interior: for instance, Tajiks and Uzbeks were heavily over-represented in 2002 
due to the Northern Alliance reaping the benefits from the defeated Taliban and Tajiks are 
still over-represented.18  
    
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of corruption  
There are many explanations why Afghan policemen engage in corrupt practices. As a staff 
member of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) explained:  
they get peanuts that hardly caters for their food so they have to do other 
things and some may join the insurgency, part-time, or other clientelistic 
networks. The police earn around 70 Afghanis a day (an estimated US$1.45 at 
the time) and most are illiterate with minimal training despite international 
donors.19  
In the ANP, salaries are low at US$70 monthly, which is insufficient to cater for an Afghan 
family and often leads to stealing and survival-based corruption.  
Afghans stress that corruption is prevalent throughout the ANP which is revealed in 
corruption perception reports. In an Afghan nationwide survey conducted for the UNDP, 27 
per cent of respondents in Kabul claimed that many police personnel routinely abuse their 
authority and 21 per cent thought the same nationwide.20 Almost two thirds of Afghans (65 
per cent) believed that many police officers use office equipment for personal use and 52 per 
cent stressed that the ANP abuse their authority. It was also emphasised by 42 per cent of the 
respondents that bribes and gifts are commonly given when communicating with the ANP. 
Almost half (48 per cent) stated that shopkeepers are regularly forced to pay a protection fee 
to policemen.21 However, it is crucial to stress that public perceptions of police corruption are 
complex and there are many entities within the Afghan police. Therefore such opinions are 
based on the ANP overall but principally concern everyday street police as most Afghans 
interact with them on a daily basis.  
Another nationwide Afghan civil society corruption perception report conducted by 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) surveyed the perceptions of 1,258 Afghan respondents 
on corruption. Of these respondents, 70 per cent believed that corruption is the most prevalent 
 
 
problem across Afghanistan insofar as it undermines the services provided by the security, 
justice and public sectors.22 The report also argues that the Afghan police is the most 
publically hated and most corrupt institution in the country that regularly extorts bribes from 
everyday civilians.23 Corruption can be seen to have threatened state-building and state-
society relations, empowered the insurgency, increased social inequality, hampered the rule 
of law and access to basic public services and led to human rights violations on a daily 
basis.24 All of these factors constrain economic development and affect the poor 
disproportionately: poorer households are forced to pay a higher slice of their income as 
bribes for basic services on a daily basis.25  
Such perceptions of high levels of corruption in the Afghan government and police have 
led to increased support for the Taliban. In the IWA survey, 60 per cent of respondents 
claimed that the Karzai administration has been the most corrupt over the last 20 years with 
the MoI and the courts being the most corrupt institutions.26According to the Head of Access 
to Justice for The Asia Foundation, the Karzai-led government is arguably one of the most 
corrupt regimes in Afghanistan’s history and has been even worse than the Taliban when they 
were in power—a striking observation given that the latter were far more violent and 
restrictive of civil liberties and human rights than the current Government of Afghanistan.27 
In the IWA survey, 50 per cent of respondents stressed that corruption contributes to the 
growth of the Taliban and a third of the respondents claimed that the Taliban are fighting 
against corruption in the Afghan government.28 Engelhardt argues that the police are fuelled 
by corruption and prefer to desert rather than fight unlike the Taliban.29  
Many Afghans, particularly truckers, that are frustrated by roadside extortion and 
increased taxes have called for a return of the Taliban regime to bring an end to police 
corruption.30 Mullah Omar, head of the Taliban, stated that the Afghan police are immoral, 
irreligious, drug addicts and are rejected from their families and, therefore, are unable to 
 
 
protect the dignity, honour and property of the Afghan people.31 The Taliban even 
promulgated their own Code of Conduct in 2006, in part to underline the high levels of 
corruption in the Afghan police. As a consequence, local Afghans face the dilemma of whom 
to side with and continually have to navigate the complex web of local power actors to ensure 
their own survival and protection.32 Dissatisfaction with the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) and the Taliban has also led to the emergence of local anti-Taliban uprisings from 
locally revived or formed armed militias. These groups have been legitimised under the 
façade of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) to fight the insurgency in remote insecure areas.33  
Farmers that cultivate the illicit poppy-crop are taxed by the Taliban, local power 
brokers, police forces, eradication forces and the ALP to preserve lucrative livelihoods for 
poppy cultivation because the Afghan government is not functional in these insecure areas.34 
UNDP’s survey also reveals that public perceptions of police engaging in the drug trade and 
crime are high in Kabul (54 per cent drugs; 44 per cent crime) and Paktika (61 per cent drugs; 
70 per cent crime).35 
 
Exploring the causes of corruption in the Afghan police  
The previous section looked at the broad manifestations of corruption in the Afghan police. It 
is now necessary to explore the prominent causes of the phenomenon. This section seeks to 
draw out four prominent causes of corruption as identified through the original research 
conducted as part of this study.  
 
Structural causes of corruption, patronage and nepotism  
Patrons that own state resources often favour family, friends, tribes and political supporters 
for appointments, financial gain or lucrative opportunities.36 Moreover, systemic corruption is 
prevalent within the MoI and individuals purchase or rent a post by paying a lump sum and/or 
 
 
sending a monthly stipend of bribes extorted up the chain of command to their superior or 
recruiter to maintain their post. This is common in lucrative drug areas.  It is also linked to 
non-meritocratic recruitment and prevalent patron-client relations.  
The Director of the American Institute of Afghanistan claimed that governorships, senior 
ministerial and police chief posts are provided by political elites on the basis of loyalty and 
bidding wars rather than meritocracy.37 Moreover, President Hamid Karzai’s cabinet has been 
involved in the narcotics trade. A worker for MAIL claimed that many provincial governors 
bid or have nepotistic kinship ties to control areas.38 An example identified by the Head of 
Access to Justice Programme for The Asia Foundation is of the late Ahmad Wali Karzai, an 
internationally renowned drug trafficker, appointed as the governor of Kandahar by his half-
brother, President Karzai.39 Such forms of corruption are systemic and engrained in the 
majority of Afghan state institutions.  
Furthermore, there are cultural connotations concerning bribery and gift-giving. These 
may be deemed as forms of corruption in the West but not in some Asian and African 
societies.40 In Afghanistan, daily bribery and providing a small gift is a frequent mode of 
contract to speed-up a transaction or basic service between the bribe payer and bribe taker—
usually a civil servant, policeman or judge.41 For instance, a Legal Consultant of the Justice 
Sector Support Programme (JSSP) claimed that he had to pay money to get his drivers’ 
licence issued so that he could take up his new post to earn money to cater for his family.42 
Similarly, the Project Co-ordinator of the Centre for Policy and Human Development 
(CPHD) argued that ‘it is an unbelievable task to be able to get your passport without paying 
someone a bribe’ because of the prevalence of so-called ‘administrative corruption’.43 
Corruption does have cultural connotations and is thus a social construction. However, the 
main argument is that corruption, whether perceived as systemic or cultural, is engrained in 
both Afghan state structures and society as part of everyday interactions.    
 
 
Economic necessity  
Corruption is caused by the lack of economic provision. Wages are inadequate to cover costs 
of living, which leads to the police demanding bribes and extortion as a survival strategy. 
This is particularly evident with low-ranked policemen. When taking this explanation into 
account, corruption and economic need are interrelated. A Legal Consultant of JSSP argued 
that houses for rent in Afghanistan are ‘not less than US$400’ and the wages of policemen 
and prosecutors are under half of this amount. As a consequence, ‘when a policeman or 
prosecutor does not have enough money to pay the rent of his house; he will take bribes’.44 
Increasing the wages of the police may reduce corruption if one surmises that corrupt 
behaviour is induced by low salaries: bribe money would be reduced if incomes rise.  
Afghan legal experts argue that pay needs to be effectively reformed in the Afghan 
police and judicial system in order to reduce corruption and bribery.45 In addition, anti-
corruption and civil society senior personnel claimed that paying higher salaries to the 
security forces can guarantee economic security for their families, enhance loyalty to the state 
and counter both corruption and the insurgency.46 Hence, the provision of adequate wages, a 
secure living environment and decreasing incentives for engaging in corruption are crucial to 
counter corruption in the police.  
 
State capture  
Parts of the state that include the government, security and justice sectors are influenced by 
non-state criminal networks and narrow private groups to preserve and protect their illicit 
interests. This entices political elites and public officials to trade in illegal and lucrative 
black-market commodities such as drugs and arms. This negatively affects the role of the 
police and their functions are perverted by political and criminal intrusion. Therefore, the 
police are influenced to protect elite and criminal groups’ black market commodities. 
 
 
Simultaneously, powerful drug-lords, senior officials and mineral smugglers who are also 
engaged in such illicit activity retain immunity from prosecution. In particular, the ANP are 
manipulated by powerful figures to release drug traffickers, killers and thieves.47   
The drug trade has resulted in weak law enforcement due to the political intrusion of the 
security and judicial sectors. USIP’s Senior Rule of Law Advisor argued that ‘the culture of 
impunity exists today’ where drug smugglers with powerful political connections ‘are not 
held accountable’ and the courts function in their interests due to bribery or threats.48 The 
Deputy Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission similarly argued 
that if notorious drug traffickers are caught then ‘the same day they are released either by the 
police, Attorney General, primary court, Supreme Court or the prison will be issued a decree 
to release these notorious people’.49 Hence, the accused that are released are often notorious 
drug traffickers.50   
Once sectors of the state have been infiltrated to serve private criminal interests, 
systemic corruption linked with the drug trade is hard to fight within Afghan institutions. 
Afghanistan has weak government institutions and investigation units that lack independence 
from political intrusion. The Director for Global Rights claimed that the Afghan government 
clearly does not ‘want a truly independent judiciary or anti-corruption agencies’.51 Due to 
forms of political intrusion that serve criminal interests, the chiefs of anti-corruption agencies 
apply flexibility and ‘leave cases on the shelf’ to avoid certain figures with political 
connections being held accountable.52  
 
Ethnic favouritism  
Favouritism with the ANSF on ethnic grounds, including the police, influences broader 
policies and local actions and creates popular resentment toward the police forces in 
particular areas. After 2002, under the then Minister of Interior, Ali Ahmad Jalali, new 
 
 
appointments were concentrated in north-west Afghanistan, with very few in the south or 
east. By the end of 2010, accusations of ethnic favouritism soared under the Tajik Interior 
Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi who ‘eased out’ many Pashtun officers from the Police 
Academy.53 This has generated competition with rival networks and posts are sold due to the 
misuse of accumulated state resources.  
The central government is hindered by widespread nepotism and corruption. President 
Karzai alienated Pashtun tribes in largely Pashtun Kandahar by appointing childhood friend 
Tooryalai Wesa—a fellow of the minority Mohammadzai tribe—as governor instead of an 
individual from Kandahar’s Ghilzai majority tribe.54 Therefore, nepotism—namely 
favouritism—is a consequence of a traditional tribal system that has been imposed on a 
central government.55 This remains prevalent.  
Furthermore, the ANP lacks loyalty to the state. A large portion of the force remains 
loyal only to regional commanders and local warlords rather than the state MoI.56 A Research 
Officer for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) argued that if the ANP 
‘were formerly loyal to an ex-commander in the north, they are probably still more loyal to 
that commander than they are to the central government’.57 Such loyalty is often based on 
ethnic grounds.  
It is important to note that all of these four types of corruption that frequently occur in 
Afghanistan are not different levels but rather different forms that are interconnected and 
overlapping. It must be acknowledged that grand corruption within President Hamid Karzai’s 
family, including drug trafficking and illicit businesses, and petty corruption such as 
patrolmen extorting bribes to supplement low income are different forms of corruption. 
However, corruption constantly fluctuates between these four explanations and may range 
from low levels to high levels of corruption. Hence, the relationship between petty and 
systemic corruption is a constant trend and the two interact with one another.  
 
 
Responses to corruption  
The previous sections covered the forms, perceptions and causes of corruption which allows 
for a discussion of anti-corruption strategies. This section covers international and Afghan 
governmental strategies for tackling corruption within the Afghan police force. It initially 
covers the efforts of Germany and the US over police reform which is followed by MoI 
efforts to curb corruption, with international assistance, and the challenges faced. The final 
part covers specific measures to combat corruption in the Afghan police. This includes the 
central issues of pay reform, meritocratic recruitment and stationing.  
 
International anti-corruption efforts  
In order to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, this section begins with an 
examination of the various initiatives and measures the Afghan government and 
internationals have introduced. Initially, the Afghan Interim Authority asked Germany to lead 
police reform due to its previous involvement in providing assistance to the police. However, 
Germany failed to successfully advance police reforms. The police remained untrained and 
had poor equipment, while 70–90 per cent were illiterate and remained loyal to warlords and 
local commanders rather than the central government.58 This led to US intervention in 2003 
bringing further resources to support electoral processes. This was followed by the 
establishment of the Combined Security Transitional Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 
2006. CSTC-A have trained and equipped the ANP, as well as the Afghan National Army 
(ANA), militarily to fight the insurgency rather than the German and European focus on 
strengthening the rule of law and human rights.59  
Since 2005, the US army has spent a staggering US$14 billion to train, reform and equip 
the ANP. The ANP had 157,000 troops in May 2014 and the aim is to reach up to 162,000 by 
the end of 2014.60 The US has spent an estimated US$102 over the past decade in an attempt 
 
 
to develop Afghanistan in addition to $6 trillion from the outset of the invasion. In addition, 
the international community has donated US$3.17 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund 
for Afghanistan police salaries but wages remain low.61  
It is also important to point out that the counter-insurgency strategy to combat the 
Taliban has generally taken precedence over protecting the public. The aggressive behaviour 
of the ALP debatably attracts further insurgent attacks in rural Afghanistan, as has been 
prominently argued by President Karzai.62 Police corruption has increased support for the 
Taliban and therefore anti-corruption efforts in the ANP can also be viewed as important in 
terms of counter-insurgency strategy.  
 
Afghan Ministry of Interior anti-corruption strategy  
In order to combat corruption, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) 
Anti-Corruption Implementation Plan based in Kabul focuses on capacity-building, 
prevention (including training) and enforcement. This three-fold strategy is part of the MoI’s 
National Police Strategy. First, building the capacity of the MoI focuses on the institutional 
systems of merit-based appointments, accountability, procurement, weapons transparency 
and personal asset exposure. In addition, an adequate police salary is on the agenda to deter 
corruption and attract high quality candidates that will remain in their posts. Second, 
prevention is to be enhanced via public awareness campaigns, specialised training and the 
application of procedures to identify corrupt activities and counter corruption, drugs and 
illegal armed opposition groups. Third, enforcement is conducted by the MoI via the 
Attorney General, Inspector General and the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) to investigate 
allegations of corruption cases under the supervision of the Attorney General’s Office 
(AGO).  
 
 
The US established the MCTF in November 2009, which has 200 agents to investigate 
the police in relation to drug and terrorism issues.63 However, the MCTF is tarnished by 
political interference. It is virtually impossible to arrest high-profile and politically connected 
individuals and this further hinders the fight against corruption. In 2010, President Karzai’s 
close adviser, Muhammad Zia Salehi—head of the National Security Council—was arrested 
for soliciting a US$10,000 car as a gift, closing a money laundering investigation of the New 
Ansari, and providing vehicles and money to presidential allies. Salehi was arrested by the 
MCTF and Deputy Attorney General and senior anti-corruption lawyer, Fazed Faqiryar. 
However, Faqiryar was forced to retire and Salehi was released, at the request of President 
Karzai, for allegedly having his human rights breached.64 This case provides ample evidence 
that the head of state can manipulate anti-corruption staff and assert his political clout during 
major cases of corruption in order to protect his close political aides.         
Despite the investigatory and referral powers that the MoI possesses to curb police 
corruption, four interviewees argued that the police are heavily involved in extorting bribes 
and that cases against corrupt officers are often dropped within the MoI. Moreover, drug-
mules are released from either the police or investigative units due to political interference.65 
Furthermore, anti-corruption and investigative agencies have little faith in the police to 
conduct unbiased professional investigations of corruption. Pay reform, meritocratic 
recruitment and stationing in the Afghan police have been endorsed to combat the four 
aforementioned explanations of the causes of police corruption.    
 
Pay reform, recruitment and stationing  
The previous section covered international and governmental attempts at police reform and 
their efforts to curb corruption in the Afghan police. This now allows a section to examine 
methods of combatting petty corruption and patronage. This section therefore covers the 
 
 
general responses on pay reform, recruitment and stationing more specifically. Initially, a 
background on police training is provided to address some of the issues with corruption prior 
to an examination on anti-corruption efforts.   
In November 2007, the US implemented the Focused District Development (FDD) 
programme to improve police reform, combat corruption, provide new equipment and 
enhance the capability of and rule of law within the ANP across 365 districts.66 Whilst the 
district police were being trained, all untrained recruits were brought to a Regional Training 
Centre for the AUP for eight weeks under the supervision of Police Mentoring Teams.67 
However, police behaviour remains poor due to the excessive use of coercion, corruption and 
extortion.  
Institutional reform in the MoI has included pay and rank reform to notably reduce 
corruption and patronage. This was implemented at the end of 2005. The ranks were 
previously ‘top heavy’ due to appointments based on patronage, resulting in too many 
generals, colonels, captains, majors and very few lieutenants.68 After pay reform, the lowest 
scale of the AUP, patrolmen, had increased in size from 36,600 to 45,880, but the wages 
remained low at US$70–80 per month.69 This is a cause for concern as the majority of the 
ANP consists of patrolmen. Pay reform thus risks failing to break the cycle of survival-based 
corruption at the lowest levels in the ANP.  
The phases of rank reform are intertwined with meritocracy as an anti-corruption 
measure. A Selection Committee was established to implement tests and a vetting process to 
disband unqualified police officers. This process has been adopted with the selection of 34 
provincial CoP positions. Yet, it was neglected by President Karzai through the June 2006 
decree when 14 police chiefs and 86 generals who failed the entry examination were 
appointed.70 This included four persons linked with illegal armed groups that were also 
barred from parliamentary elections. In addition, others included renowned human rights 
 
 
violators, narcotics traffickers and warlords, and several were involved in government 
corruption, bribery and interference in police investigations.71 These provincial police chiefs 
and generals should have been investigated for human rights violations and corruption rather 
than being arbitrarily appointed.   
Candidates with low levels of literacy regularly fake qualifications and change their 
ethnic backgrounds for the recruitment of an ethnically balanced and diverse police force that 
is proportional to the population. As a consequence, large numbers of corrupt and 
incompetent individuals linked with leading power groups in the MoI and cabinet enter the 
ANP which hinders meritocracy.72 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
sectored surveys also suggest that 54 per cent of the ANP received assistance in recruitment 
and eight per cent paid bribes.73 In Jalalabad, the ‘admission, selection, appointment and 
promotion’ processes are not based on merit but rather corruption and, across Afghanistan, 
police are ‘selected, appointed and promoted’.74 This is due to their affiliation with warlords 
and high-level corrupt government officials, with bribes expected in such processes.  
Loyalty and patronage still persist. In particular, the recruitment of local police and 
irregular militias at the provincial and district levels are beyond the overly centralised Afghan 
government. Irregular militias are recruited rather than the police from Karzai’s cabinet. For 
example, ex-human rights violator Ismail Khan, Minister of Water and Energy since 2005 in 
Herat, appoints militiamen that are loyal and serve his interests.  
Afghan police officers purchase the post where they want to be assigned. This is usually 
in areas where there are opportunities to engage in petty corruption such as extorting bribes 
from cart vendors selling produce in main cities.75 Moreover, the police officers pay to work 
in high poppy cultivating areas in order to work within the border patrol force to extort bribes 
from merchants and truckers involved in smuggling.76  
Anti-corruption strategies have focused on limiting ethnic and tribal discrimination 
 
 
within the ANSF. Alikuzai claims that this is to ensure that certain ethnic groups or 
individuals from ‘particular regions’ who lack access to influential power brokers in high-
level commands ‘are not selectively posted’ to extremely hostile ‘areas for too long without 
being rotated out’ and that commands are not dominated by Tajiks or another particular 
ethnic group.77 The MoI suggests that its own ministry is extremely politicised and well-
connected illiterate provincial police chiefs with no police experience or qualifications are 
appointed, namely by President Karzai. The MoI also claim that resources are diverted within 
the ministry and the loyalty of senior officers to the police is relatively unknown.78 Afghan 
citizens claim that the MoI officials, provincial police chiefs and ordinary ANP are involved 
in the opium trade. There are various reports of senior MoI officials selling provincial and 
district senior police posts to the highest bidders and protecting narcotics traffickers in 
exchange of receiving large bribes.79  
Systemic corruption linked to tribal ties and provincial or local loyalties has been 
internationally recognised. In order to address this issue, lottery assignments for new ANP 
recruits were installed by the MoI with the assistance of CSTC-A to place police in random 
provinces to reduce patronage networks, tribal, ethnic, familial and political ties. A 
centralised national recruitment programme was implemented to prevent graduates of 
Regional Training Centres returning to the province where they were initially recruited. The 
February 2010 lottery assignment system has been implemented with cadets of the National 
Military Academy of Afghanistan at their graduation to prevent personnel buying positions 
from corrupt ANA officer corps.80 The strategy also increases the transparency of 
assignments and ensures that personnel are assigned randomly to all Afghan regions.  
Despite such efforts, elder selections may be based on personal, ethnic and other partisan 
interests. These selections are part of a qawm system81 to provide loyalty to the appointer 
which overrides meritocratic appointments. Elder selection involves a local elder vouching 
 
 
for police candidates to be selected in their province. This mechanism applies mainly to the 
ALP, not AUP. Policemen with good relations with senior ranked police officers, a CoP, 
local governor or tribal elder can easily be posted to the province of their choice. Posting can 
therefore be based on loyalty or paying to work in the desired province with a lump sum or 
monthly payments to the appointer via a stipend of bribes collected.82 Hence, corruption, 
loyalty and patronage still remain with recruitment, meritocracy and stationing of the ANP. 
Based on this overview of the central facets of the major anti-corruption strategies, the 
following section will critically examine pay reform, recruitment, stationing and broader anti-
corruption strategies with specific reference to the surveys conducted.   
 
Analysis  
In the previous sections, the causes of corruption and anti-corruption strategies have been 
addressed. This section analyses the surveys conducted with 100 low-ranked policemen in 
Kabul, Logar, Laghman and 12 other provinces. The analysis is divided into two separate 
parts. The first considers key variables, identified in survey findings, such as living costs, 
expenses, salary and the number of breadwinners per household that help to account for the 
pervasive corruption identified in the earlier sections of the article. These are the 
determinants of corruption. The second part considers stationing strategy. A factor in the 
initial variables is the number of earners per household which may be affected with random 
assignment. The survey respondents’ perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption strategies 
will be reflected upon, considering, for instance, whether they felt wages were sufficient to 
cover living costs and the influence of patronage relations on appointments. Such perceptions 
provide important insights into the dynamics of survival-based corruption and the reasons 
behind lottery assignments. It is the perceptions and empirical evidence that will be analysed 
 
 
in relation to both causes of corruption, a deficit of wages and stationing of policemen. The 
end of the analysis will, however, demonstrate the contradictions of random assignments.   
 
Determinants of corruption  
This section analyses the possible determinants of corruption in order to convey certain 
trends that may impact on corruption such as wages being too low to cover total expenditure 
and patrolmen being stationed with large families in distant provinces. According to survey 
respondents, the main determinant of corruption is wage deficiency and other variables add to 
the economic hardship that low-ranked Afghan policemen face.   
The surveys show that the average number of family members per household is 11.5 and 
solely for patrolmen it is 11. Hence, the majority of the policemen surveyed have large 
families.83 Alongside large families, 48 out of 52 respondents lived in owned housing with an 
average of 5.5 rooms per household and the average number of breadwinners per household 
is 2.45. For patrolmen, most (42 out of 76) live in rented accommodation with 34 out of 76 in 
owned housing and the average number of breadwinners per household is 2.3. Taking this 
into consideration, the families are large, many family members share rooms and there are no 
more than two household earners on average. This means that the wages will have to be 
sufficient for the breadwinners to cover the total expenses for large families. The total living 
costs, expenses and wages earned will now be addressed.    
The average salary of the 100 low-ranked police respondents is 12,824 AFN per month 
with an average total cost of living of 17,570 AFN per month. This means that there is an 
amount of 4,746 AFN that is required to supplement the low wages in order to cover the total 
expenses of large families, particularly if there is only one breadwinner.84 In relation to the 76 
patrolmen, the average number of family members is 11 with monthly wages at 12,008 AFN 
and expenses at 15,237 AFN per month. This means that there is a deficit of 3,229 AFN per 
 
 
month for patrolmen. This data implies that the deficiency of wages to cover total living costs 
and expenditure can exacerbate modes of petty corruption as supplementary measures for low 
salaries.  
Various examples from the respondents confirm the existence of the issue of wage 
deficiency to cater for living costs and expenses. To offer one example from many, a 
patrolman working in Paktia earns 12,000 AFN per month to cater for 11 family members as 
the sole breadwinner in owned accommodation with total living costs of 15,000 AFN 
monthly. This is a 3,000 AFN wage deficit. Hence, the patrolman claimed that his salary was 
not adequate to cover his living costs. In addition, he had been working as a patrolman for 18 
months and had not undergone any pay and rank reform. Consequently, his salary had 
remained the same and he stressed that bribery and roadside extortion are the main practices 
of corruption in the ANP due to low wages. This case and numerous other such examples 
provide tentative evidence that when wages are too low to pay for the total costs of living and 
expenses, corrupt practices such as bribery and roadside extortion can result due to the 
economic hardship associated with low wages.  
There were similar findings on possible causes and practices of petty corruption related 
to low wages. The main forms of corruption that the survey respondents listed were: weak 
oversight and implementation of disciplinary procedures (reported by half of the 
respondents); low pay from 22 out of the 100 lower ranked policemen (22 per cent);85 bribery 
and roadside extortion from 20 per cent; embezzlement of funds from 10 per cent and greed 
and selfishness from only two per cent. In relation to perceptions of levels of corruption in 
the ANP, 38 per cent of the respondents thought that it is low, 32 per cent suggested that 
corruption is medium, 22 per cent believed that corruption is non-existent, six per cent 
perceived that it is high and two per cent claimed that the level of corruption is extreme in the 
ANP. These findings indicate that the policemen believed that oversight and punitive 
 
 
sanctions were poor and low pay and forms of petty corruption were the main forms of 
corruption. The correlation of low pay and petty corruption may indicate that practices such 
as bribery and roadside extortion may be to supplement low wages.     
In response to questions that asked how respondents might improve pay and rank reform 
and anti-corruption strategies, a number of ideas were put forward. Many respondents stated 
that higher salary increments would help to cover all living costs and provide motivation for 
good performance and behaviour. For instance, a first lieutenant working in Logar and a 
patrolman working in Kapisa claimed that low pay is a factor that causes corruption in the 
Afghan police. In addition, a second lieutenant from Kabul claimed that higher salaries for 
government employees were needed to reduce corruption in the ANP. A patrolman working 
in Panjshir stressed that strong oversight and monitoring of the recruitment process and 
higher salaries are needed to reduce corruption in the Afghan police institution. Furthermore, 
a patrolman working in Kabul stated that his salary is ‘slightly short to fulfil daily life’ and 
that ‘increasing police salaries in the lower ranks can finish corruption’.     
Family structure was another issue identified by respondents as importantly impacting 
anti-corruption efforts. Large families rely on more than one breadwinner to cover living 
costs. For all of those that were the sole breadwinner (18 of the respondents), only two first 
lieutenants and one patrolman stressed that they were able to cover the total expenses of the 
household with their salary. One of the first lieutenants working in his home province, Logar, 
by his own request earns 13,500 AFN per month that covers his 8,000 AFN monthly living 
costs and expenses for eight family members in owned accommodation (consisting of five 
rooms). The other first lieutenant working in his home province, Kunduz, by qawm, familial 
or political ties earns 13,500 AFN per month that covers 10,000 AFN monthly total costs for 
six family members in owned accommodation (consisting of four rooms). In addition, a 
patrolman working in his home province, Kapisa, by his own request earns 10,500 AFN that 
 
 
covers 5,000 AFN total monthly living costs and expenses for eight family members in 
owned housing (consisting of three rooms). In these three cases, even though there is only 
one breadwinner per household, the salary is high enough to cover low total living costs and 
expenses. This provides empirical evidence that wages in the lower ranks were sufficient to 
cover the living costs and expenses of large families. However, these perceptions of sole 
breadwinners are only based on three of the survey respondents and therefore the other 15 
breadwinners struggled with financial costs.   
The remainder of lone breadwinners suggested that they could not cover all of their costs 
with their wages. For instance, a second lieutenant from Kabul earns 18,000 AFN monthly 
but pays 30,000 AFN per month for living costs and expenses for 18 family members. This 
lieutenant stressed that he could not afford the expenses of daily life financially as he was the 
only breadwinner of the household. Moreover, a patrolman working in Kabul pays 12,000 
AFN per month in living costs and expenses but only earns 11,000 AFN as the sole 
breadwinner for seven family members. These responses emphasising insufficient wages, 
principally for lone breadwinners, to cover living costs and expenses suggests that these 
policemen find it difficult to survive. Hence, there is a high possibility that salary 
supplementation will be a necessity to cover costs such as engagement in petty corruption.  
On the other hand, if there is more than one breadwinner then the policemen claimed that 
they were able to cover their total living costs and expenses due to support from another 
family member—namely brother or father. To illustrate, a patrolman working in Logar earns 
11,500 AFN per month to contribute to 15,000 AFN monthly for living costs and expenses. 
However, the living costs and expenses are affordable due to two salaried household 
members including his father. Similarly, a first lieutenant that works in Kabul pays 20,000 
AFN in monthly expenses (for 13 family members) with a monthly salary of 14,500 AFN. 
 
 
Despite a 5,500 AFN deficit, he could afford expenses and living costs due to three 
breadwinners within the household. 
Even in instances where there was more than one breadwinner per household working in 
a home province who earned less than their monthly expenses but could afford expenses due 
to additional salaries within the household, these respondents recognised that it would be 
difficult if they were the sole earner. For instance, a patrolman working in his home province, 
Khost, (who could afford his expenses due to two breadwinners) claimed that salaries should 
be increased to reduce corruption in the ANP due to the fact that it is tough for one 
breadwinner to cover all living costs. In addition, a patrolman working in Kabul with the 
support of five additional earners within the household also acknowledged that covering total 
living costs and expenses would be difficult in households that only have one salaried 
person.86 Similarly, a patrolman from Nangarhar suggested that his 500 AFN monthly deficit 
of wages for living costs and expenses was affordable due to two breadwinners but it would 
be tough if he was the only breadwinner.   
According to the surveys conducted, it can be argued that pay reform has made little 
difference at the lower levels of the Afghan police. Patrolmen/non-ranked street police still 
have low wages and a limited amount of money to pay for the cost of living, unless there is 
more than one breadwinner per household. The former Afghan Minister of Interior claimed 
that he needed more time to ‘improve the living conditions of the police force, especially 
assisting them with a housing scheme and also health care’ to combat petty corruption.87   
 
Stationing strategy  
The analysis so far has provided perceptions and empirical evidence that suggests that low 
wages, particularly when there is only one earner per household, can lead to corrupt practices. 
This is to supplement income in order to cater for living costs and expenses for large families. 
 
 
Therefore, strategies to curb corruption are needed such as pay reform which may reduce 
petty corruption. Yet, there are also other forms of corruption that were emphasised by the 
survey respondents when questions were asked about attempts to challenge police corruption.   
On the subject of anti-corruption strategies, only five of the survey respondents knew 
what the MoI anti-corruption strategy entailed. The main strategies to combat corruption in 
the Afghan police, as indicated by the respondents, consist of providing strong 
oversight/monitoring of the police to hire and select more honest staff. The respondents 
expressed that better screening will not only lead to the hiring of more honest staff, but will 
also avoid police recruitment based on personal relations. This is informative as an indication 
of MoI strategies that have failed to be understood by the lower levels of the police force but 
it was acknowledged that patronage relations leading to appointments hinder the meritocratic 
credibility of the ANP.      
It is clear from the analysis that the stationing strategy has been implemented due to 
concern regarding the influence of patronage relations in relation to appointments. This 
became clear from the respondents of the surveys. Patronage was well emphasised as an 
occurrence in relation to appointments and stationing. Seventy-eight of the policemen, 
excluding the 22 that were randomly assigned to an away province, obtained their positions 
through patronage mechanisms via elder and officer selections, qawm ties and by their own 
request. These methods of stationing are associated with favours to the appointers. Thirty-six 
of the survey respondents claimed that the positions of ANP and MoI staff are patronage-
based and that staff are appointed on the basis of factional, kinship or ethnic ties.  
For those who thought that patronage in recruitment occurs in the ANP (36 per cent), it 
was perceived that patronage mainly persists in MoI positions. It was also stressed by these 
respondents that if a policeman knows a commander or a high rank officer, then that 
policeman will get more salary increments and promotions. These respondents’ insights 
 
 
included a friend or academy class fellow having entered high positions due to good relations 
with senior staff or a commander. For instance, a second lieutenant (who works in his home 
province, Kabul, by officer selection) stressed that patronage existed as one of his friends was 
employed by a personal relation.88 In addition, a patrolman working in Panjshir believed that 
patronage appointments were prevalent in the ANP and MoI. The patrolman provided an 
example of a friend who knew a commander that admitted him into a position.     
The perceptions of patronage were similar to the above findings when policemen were 
randomly assigned to another province under the lottery system. To illustrate, a non-ranked 
policeman who was randomly assigned to Nangarhar, an away province, claimed that 
patronage was prevalent in the ANP and MoI staff. He provided an example of one of his 
academy classmates attaining a high rank due to good relations with high authorities.  
As a result of the perceptions of patronage obtained from the survey respondents and the 
wider literature, as analysed previously, stationing has been endorsed in the Afghan police to 
challenge the influence of patronage-based appointments. Patronage has repercussions on 
both meritocracy and loyalty to the state. Now that the perceptions of patronage have been 
addressed, the remaining parts of this analysis will cover the methods of stationing, as part of 
efforts to curb patronage-based corruption, and the repercussions that it has on overall anti-
corruption strategies.  
There are various measures concerning the location of policemen that may have an 
impact on corruption. Fifty-two per cent of survey respondents work in their home province 
and 48 per cent work in an away province. For patrolmen, 40 out of 76 work in an away 
province and 36 work in their home province. There are six ways that the ANP can enter their 
posts in certain locations: (1) by their own request; (2) elder selection; (3) officer selection; 
(4) qawm, familial or political ties; (5) the lottery (random) system; and (6) paying for a 
location. Of the survey respondents, 44 per cent were posted by their own request; 22 per cent 
 
 
by the lottery (random) system; 18 per cent by elder selection; 10 per cent by qawm, familial 
or political ties; four per cent by officer selection and two per cent paid for their location. For 
patrolmen, 32 out of 76 (42 per cent) suggested that they were posted in their location by 
their own request; 26 per cent by the lottery (random) system; 18 per cent by elder selection; 
eight per cent by qawm, familial or political ties; three per cent by officer selection and three 
per cent paid for their location.  
There is some correlation between a home and away province when an officer is posted 
by their own request. Twenty-four out of 44 of the policemen were posted by their own 
request within their home province and 20 out of 44 in an away province. For patrolmen, 18 
out of 32 were posted in their home province by own request and 14 out of 32 in an away 
province. This means that the majority of policemen prefer to be posted in their home 
province which is arguably due to pre-exiting connections and a better likelihood of having 
owned accommodation. In addition, there may be further economic support with wider family 
structures in a familiar province.    
Yet, when analysing the data in Kabul, 10 out of 16 policemen that were posted by their 
own request opted for their home province—Kabul. In addition, six out of the 10 policemen 
that were working in Kabul and posted by their own request from away provinces requested 
to move and work in Kabul. When comparing the wages with other provinces, they were 
similar and sometimes even lower.   
Therefore, there are certain motivations that lead to policemen requesting to be stationed 
in Kabul. As these findings strongly suggest, a major factor appears to be better opportunities 
such as extorting more bribes from street vendors and passing vehicles for bogus offences. 
Subsequently, a stipend of the bribes collected is paid up the chain of command to the CoP or 
other senior officers.89 In addition to opportunities for bribery, other important factors which 
lead recruits and officers to demand posting to particular areas include the level of insecurity 
 
 
and physical risk. Related to both is the distance and risk involved in travelling to visit one’s 
family.  
All of the elder selections led to the appointment of policemen in their home provinces. 
In Nangarhar, elders hold powerful influence concerning the appointment of patrolmen 
according to the six surveys conducted in the province.90 Five out of six policemen, all 
patrolmen, were selected to work in their home province by elder selection and the other one 
was randomly assigned to work in Nangarhar. With qawm, familial or political ties, only two 
out of 10 (both patrolmen) were posted in an away province. In relation to officer selections, 
two out of four policemen were posted in home provinces. There were two instances whereby 
survey respondents admitted that they had paid to be stationed in an away province. To 
provide one example, a patrolman working in Panjshir claimed that he had paid to move from 
his home province.91 
In relation to the second highest method of posting policemen, the lottery (random) 
system, all of the respondents were posted in away provinces. This is to reduce patronage 
networks, qawm advantages and loyalty by serving the interests of an elder, officer or 
commander. Moreover, this is designed to combat the practice of policemen paying to be 
stationed in a preferred location. Many of the lottery assigned policemen have a slightly 
lower ratio of breadwinners per household—two per household. Only six out of the 22 are the 
only breadwinner per household and all reside in rented accommodation. In all of these cases, 
the policemen claimed that their salary was insufficient to cater for living costs and family 
expenses.  
For example, a patrolman who applied to his nearest department of police was randomly 
posted to Kapisa. He claimed that his salary was not enough to cater for living costs and 
expenses because he is the only breadwinner.92 Furthermore, in one instance where there are 
two breadwinners for a household with a large family in an away province due to the lottery 
 
 
system, it is still difficult to cater for living costs and family expenses. To specify, a 
patrolman working in Logar by lottery assignment claimed that his salary is too low to cover 
high monthly living costs and family expenses despite having two breadwinners within the 
household.93 It can therefore be argued that policemen that are randomly assigned under the 
lottery system to an away province struggle to pay for living costs and family expenses if 
they are the sole breadwinner. This is also the case in some instances if there are two 
breadwinners.94  
Although the lottery system was designed to reduce clientelism and patronage networks, 
it may negatively impact anti-corruption strategies. According to the results of this survey, 
the police would have to be paid more or provided with governmental housing (where there is 
no second earner) otherwise this system runs the risk of further survival-based corruption for 
economic necessity even if pay is increased.  
This suggests that lottery assignments are also counterproductive. The strategy removes 
policemen from family support networks and they are often forced to survive as the only 
breadwinner in, most likely, rented accommodation. The survey results support the claim that 
the police that are assigned away from their home province cannot afford living expenses as a 
sole breadwinner. However, if the police work in their home province, then their father or 
brother can help to cover expenses and that potentially reduces the risk of survival-based 
corruption, namely bribery and roadside extortion.   
This research points toward important measures that could help to enhance anti-
corruption strategies by emphasising the way pay reform and meritocracy need to work 
together. This is especially apparent where it has proven counterproductive to post policemen 
to distant provinces if there is no relative to help with living costs. Such practices pose the 
risk of encouraging patrolmen’s engagement in corrupt and illicit activities to supplement 
wages to cover living costs. In terms of anti-corruption, the MoI has focused on meritocracy 
 
 
and challenging clientelism through provincial random assignment. However, the police that 
are randomly assigned in provinces away from their homes and even some policemen 
working in their home province will struggle with their salary as a sole breadwinner. The 
analysis presented above indicates that random stationing may exacerbate survival-based 
corruption if low-ranked policemen are sent away to another province and if they are the sole 
breadwinner. Hence, the analysis points to two causes of corruption, from the perceptions and 
empirical evidence, which are wage deficiency and stationing.      
 
Conclusion  
This article has sought to demonstrate the many damaging effects of corruption and 
clientelism within Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry, focusing on the police. Such practices 
have resulted in petty bribery, extortion, ethnic favouritism and infiltration by political elites 
affiliated with drug traffickers. Low wages in the ANP have led to survival-based corruption. 
Customs officials, border police and uniformed police are vulnerable to bribes from narcotics 
traffickers and other criminal groups. ‘Corruption in the voting processes’ during elections 
has delegitimised state officials in the eyes of the Afghan public and this can be identified as 
a driver of Taliban remobilisation.95 These features are also hindering the effectiveness, 
efficiency and competence of the police and MoI.  
In relation to senior police, CoP posts in poppy-rich districts are sold to the highest 
bidder willing to provide protection to narcotics traffickers at a going rate of US$100,000 for 
a six month post with a $60 per month clean salary. The MoI can be thought of as a market 
that sells police posts to the highest bidder—this arguably confirms its reputation as 
Afghanistan’s most corrupt institution.96 Endemic corruption, clientelistic relations and the 
accumulation of state resources have increased both ‘inter-factional competition’ and ‘costs 
 
 
of appointments’, and the sale of posts and protection is also present in the Presidential 
Office.97  
The internal MoI anti-corruption strategy has attempted to curb corruption within the 
police through the operation of various investigation units. However, in high drug-related 
cases that are transferred to the MCTF and other units such as the High Office of Oversight 
and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC), political interference influences the cases and many are 
dropped due to cronyism.98 This is a consequence of state capture. The Afghan state has been 
infiltrated by the narrow interests of non-state criminal networks and powerful elites linked 
with the illicit and lucrative opium trade that manipulates law enforcement, anti-corruption 
and all investigation, security and judicial duties. It is also important to stress that there are 
many forms of corruption and politicisation which are not linked to poppy cultivation and 
opium trafficking such as land theft, custom evasion, seizure and misappropriation of foreign 
aid, state resources, jobs and economic benefits.   
This article has demonstrated that pay reform does have the potential to reduce 
corruption, particularly in the lower levels of the ANP. According to the surveys with 100 
Afghan policemen, mainly patrolmen and some lieutenants, increasing salaries can 
significantly reduce survival-based corruption in the lower ranks. Lottery assignments have 
been installed as a measure to eliminate patronage-based corruption and loyalty to warlords 
and local commanders. Yet, this can be counterproductive. Low-paid policemen stationed in 
another province away from their home in rented accommodation are less likely to have 
financial support from a father or brother. As a consequence, the policemen in this situation 
may struggle to cater for the rent and total familial expenses for large families. This can 
therefore exacerbate lower levels of corruption as a means of economic necessity. Pay reform 
and lottery assignments need further reforming if they are going to seriously reduce both 
corruption and clientelism.  
 
 
Pay reform has the potential to combat petty corruption in the lower ranks but systemic 
corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain unchallenged with a linear approach. 
Hence, increasing the salaries of Afghan policemen would reduce corruption but not 
significantly. If wages were increased with pay reform as a singular anti-corruption strategy, 
patronage relations would persist and oversight, disciplinary and internal anti-corruption 
strategy issues that were prioritised by the ANP survey respondents would remain.  
High corruption levels in the ANP and the government has reduced the legitimacy of the 
state in the eyes of Afghans. It has also been contended that this has led to Taliban 
resurgence. With the Karzai era coming to a close, it is imperative that the new Afghan 
President, either Abdullah Abdullah or Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, focuses on a robust anti-
corruption strategy within the police force in order to rebuild trust in the police and state. 
This may deter support for the Taliban. Anti-corruption, particularly in this context, serves as 
a broader peace-building strategy and if this is not taken seriously by the new Afghan 
President then the conflict will remain unresolved, stagnating the post-war recovery process 
and wider development.     
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